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I.  INTRODUCTION 
―I wouldn‘t wish what I am going through on anyone,‖ Senator Ted 
Stevens commented after losing his seat in the United States Senate on 
November 18, 2008.
1
 Senator Stevens lost the race largely because a 
criminal conviction damaged his reputation.
2
 After Senator Stevens 
endured months of contentious litigation, the jury convicted the longest 
serving Republican senator in United States history on seven felony counts 
of ethics violations.
3
 Six months later, the presiding judge, the Honorable 
Emmet Sullivan, vacated the conviction at the request of Attorney General 
Eric Holder because of blatant failures to disclose exculpatory evidence.
4
 
Senator Stevens
5
 brings a high-profile example to the continuing 
discussion of the problems inherent in the criminal disclosure rules. His 
case exemplifies how the current structure of the material disclosure 
standard often results in the suppression of material evidence. 
A criminal prosecutor possesses considerable authority over the 
evolution of a criminal proceeding.
6
 As a result, one of a prosecutor‘s 
primary responsibilities is to ensure that trials are fair.
7
 The Constitution,
8
 
the opinions of the Supreme Court,
9
 the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct,
10
 and the American Bar Association‘s Standards for Criminal 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Carl Hulse, Democrats Gain as Stevens Loses His Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
2008, at A1. 
 2. See id. 
 3. Id.; Neil A. Lewis, Senator is Guilty over His Failures to Disclose Gifts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
28, 2008, at A1.  
 4. Adam Clymer, Ted Stevens, 86, Helped Shape Alaska in 40 Years in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 11, 2010, at A12; Carrie Johnson & Del Quentin Wilber, Holder Asks Judge to Drop Case 
Against Ex-Senator; Justice Dept. Cites Prosecutors’ Behavior During Stevens Trial, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 2, 2009, at A1.  
 5. Regardless of the public disapproval Senator Stevens has received from his ―bridge-to-
nowhere,‖ Senator Stevens is a sympathetic character in this instance because the justice system 
failed him. If the justice system can fail a sitting United States senator, it can certainly fail the rest 
of the American population as well. Later, before his case could have been tried again, Senator 
Stevens died in a plane crash on August 9, 2010. William Yardley & Liz Robbins, Ex-Senator 
From Alaska Is Killed in Air Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at A10. 
 6. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (―[T]he prosecution, which alone can 
know what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net 
effect of all such evidence and make disclosure . . . .‖). 
 7. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (―Society wins not only when the guilty are 
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when 
any accused is treated unfairly.‖). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process Clause); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (―We now 
hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of 
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.‖). 
 9. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 
88 (1935). 
 10. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2009) (―The prosecutor in a criminal case 
2
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Justice
11
 establish this obligation. Accordingly, a criminal prosecutor must 
not only convict the guilty but must also ensure that the innocent are not 
convicted.
12
 Pursuant to that responsibility, a prosecutor must disclose 
material evidence to the defense.
13
  
Beginning in Brady v. Maryland,
14
 and continuing to Strickler v. 
Greene,
15
 the Supreme Court‘s line of cases established the framework 
underlying a criminal prosecutor‘s duty to disclose.16 The Supreme Court 
has held that the material evidence standard
17
 consists of three 
components: (1) the evidence must be favorable to the accused, either 
because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must 
be willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) ―prejudice 
must have ensued.‖18 
While the Supreme Court‘s precedent establishes a clear standard, its 
subsequent interpretation and application have created an array of 
complexity.
19
 Too often, prosecutors have interpreted their disclosure 
obligations inconsistently.
20
 The current standard requires a sensitive case-
                                                                                                                     
shall . . . make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the 
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense . . . .‖). 
 11. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 
§ 3-3.11(a) (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] (―A prosecutor should not intentionally 
fail to make timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of 
all evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense 
charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused.‖). 
 12. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (―[The prosecutor] is in a peculiar and very definite sense the 
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guild shall not escape or innocence suffer.‖). 
 13. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437; United States 
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682–84 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–11 (1976); 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1972); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 14. Brady, 373 U.S. 83. 
 15. Strickler, 527 U.S. 263. 
 16. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682–84; Agurs, 
427 U.S. at 110–11; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153–54; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 17. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.  
 18. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82.  
 19. See Kevin C. McMunigal, The Craft of Due Process, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 477, 487–89 
(2001). Professor Kevin McMunigal notes that the Supreme Court‘s cases dealing with 
prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence create a lot of ―confusion‖ and ―practical 
application problems remain.‖ Id. McMunigal primarily attributes this confusion to the lingering 
ambiguity of the rule‘s scope. Id. at 488; see also Jannice E. Joseph, The New Russian Roulette: 
Brady Revisited, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 33, 35 (2004) (―While the United States Supreme Court‘s central 
holding in Brady was favorable to defendants, subsequent cases demonstrated that the contours of 
Brady were not clear.‖). 
 20. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposal: Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable 
Information Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 94 
(2004). (―With neither a clear definition of favorable evidence nor a disclosure timetable, 
prosecutors have interpreted the constitutional discovery obligation inconsistently . . . .‖). The 
article goes on to state: 
 
Federal prosecutors, largely focusing on the word ―exculpatory,‖ have 
interpreted the Brady disclosure obligation in a variety of ways. A number of 
3
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by-case analysis to determine whether disclosure is required.
21
 These case-
by-case determinations of the evidence‘s materiality have failed to produce 
clear guidelines for when prosecutors need to disclose exculpatory 
evidence.
22
 More problematic, these varying prosecutorial interpretations 
have undermined Brady‘s constitutional significance.23 The lack of clarity 
inherent in the standard exposes the prosecutor to cognitive biases when he 
attempts to determine which evidence to disclose and which to conceal.
24
 
With the advent of modern technology, post-conviction DNA evidence 
sheds some empirical light on how prosecutorial suppression of material 
evidence undermines Brady‘s constitutional significance and constitutes a 
major cause of wrongful convictions.
25
 Post-conviction DNA evidence has 
exonerated more than two hundred criminal defendants, and according to 
some research, almost half of those cases involved prosecutorial 
misconduct.
26
 Nearly a half century after Brady, prosecutors still fail to 
disclose material evidence.
27
 Some research even suggests that 16%–19% 
of reversals in capital cases are attributable to the non-disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence.
28
 These numbers are quite difficult to swallow while 
holding a confident belief that the criminal justice system convicts the 
guilty but spares the innocent. Could it be true that one out of every five 
                                                                                                                     
prosecutors have interpreted Brady narrowly and believe that a prosecutor‘s 
Brady obligation is limited solely to turning over information that someone 
other than the defendant has confessed to the crime at issue. Many prosecutors 
do not focus on the critical language of the Brady decision, which requires 
disclosure of evidence that tends to exculpate or reduce one‘s penalty. Others, 
knowing of favorable evidence, have tried to predict its effect on the outcome 
of the case in deciding whether to disclose. Still others do not view Giglio or 
impeachment material as part of the Brady exculpatory disclosure obligation. 
And yet others have separated the timing of the disclosure of exculpatory or 
guilt-related evidence from the disclosure of mitigating or punishment-related 
evidence.  
Id. at 103–04. 
 21. McMunigal, supra note 19, at 485. The Supreme Court‘s standard from ―the line of cases 
from Brady v. Maryland through Strickler v. Greene on prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence‖ is the  ―product of a gradual, case-by-case process of accretion.‖ Id. 
 22. Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 509 (2009) 
(―[C]ase-by-case determinations of the materiality of undisclosed evidence have failed to produce 
clear guidelines for prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence.‖). 
 23. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 95. After its review of the issue, the 
subcommittee of the Federal Criminal Procedure Committee of the American College of Trial 
Lawyers report stated, ―[t]his Committee believes that the constitutional mandate of Brady has been 
undermined by varying prosecutorial interpretations . . . .‖ Id. 
 24. See Burke, supra note 22, at 483 (―[T]he current constitutional standard amplifies 
cognitive biases that will distort even an ethical prosecutor‘s application of Brady and 
systematically lead to under-disclosure of exculpatory evidence.‖). 
 25. Id. at 509–10. 
 26. Id. at 510 & n.179.  
 27. Id. at 509 (―Forty-five years have passed since the Court announced its decision in Brady, 
and yet the widespread failure of prosecutors to disclose Brady material is well known.‖).  
 28. Id. at 510 n.180.   
4
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prosecutors in capital cases that are reversed results from prosecutors 
intentionally concealing evidence? The issue, however, is not limited to a 
prosecutor‘s intent to conceal evidence. Rather, what these statistics point 
out is that our system is flawed because of the lack of clearly defined rules 
that fail to counteract the cognitive biases inherent in the disclosure 
decisionmaking process.  
As these startling statistics demonstrate, the current material evidence 
standard fails to provide defendants sufficient access to exonerable 
evidence.
29
 As Professor Alafair S. Burke explains, ―the Court‘s standard 
of materiality invites prosecutors to systematically undervalue it. Because 
of cognitive biases, prosecutors will overestimate the strength of their case 
in the absence of the evidence at issue, underestimate the potentially 
exculpatory value of the evidence, and therefore fail to recognize 
materiality even when it exists.‖30 The innocent, not the guilty, bear the 
cost of that failure.
31
 This Note addresses the complexities in the current 
standard that leave prosecutors vulnerable to cognitive bias. Part II 
provides an overview of the criminal prosecutor‘s obligation to disclose 
material evidence. Part III examines how, under the present standard, 
cognitive bias affects the prosecutor‘s decisionmaking process, causing 
even prosecutors acting in good faith to under-disclose.
32
 Part IV 
demonstrates how objective guidelines could ameliorate cognitive bias in 
decisionmaking.
33
 This Note argues for the implementation of bright-line 
rules to guide prosecutorial discretion. It urges a solution that identifies the 
salient facts from the case law and enumerates those facts into a codified 
Strickler three-prong standard.
34
 A bright-line standard should exist 
requiring disclosure when any of the following scenarios are present:
35
 
(1) Prior perjury or false testimony of a government witness; 
(2) Promises of immunity to a government witness; 
(3) Monetary rewards to key government witnesses; 
(4) Mental impairments of a government witness; 
(5) Information reflecting bias or prejudice of a government 
witness against defendant; 
(6) Confessions to the crime by others; and 
(7) Inconsistent or contradictory scientific tests.36 
 
Such bright-line disclosure rules will confine a prosecutor‘s discretion 
within substantive, clear lines by enumerating uniform and demonstrable 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Id. (―The Brady doctrine has failed to accomplish its objective of providing defendants 
access to material exculpatory evidence . . . .‖). 
 30. Id. at 499. 
 31. Id. at 510–11 (―[T]he costs of that failure are borne not by the guilty, but by the 
innocent.‖). 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. See infra Part IV. 
 34. See infra Part IV. 
 35. See infra Part IV.A. 
 36. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 103. 
5
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standards that would require disclosure.
37
 Doing so will reduce the 
opportunity for cognitive bias to creep into a prosecutor‘s decisionmaking 
process.
38
 By counteracting the cognitive bias inherent in the present 
standard, a codified solution would prevent unintentional under-disclosure 
and, ultimately, ensure a defendant‘s constitutional rights are better 
preserved.
39
 
II.  PROSECUTOR‘S DUTY TO DISCLOSE: THE MATERIAL EVIDENCE 
STANDARD 
A.  Special Role of the Prosecutor to Ensure a Fair Trial 
The prosecutor‘s first and foremost responsibility is to administer 
justice.
40
 The prosecutor is placed in a unique position in regard to the 
adjudication process.
41
 He possesses substantial authority over all aspects 
of a criminal proceeding, especially with regard to evidence.
42
 As a result, 
he has the dual responsibility to ensure that the guilty shall not escape and 
the innocent shall not suffer.
43
 A criminal prosecutor is called to 
heightened responsibilities because ―[he] is the representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to 
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all.‖44 
Thus, a prosecutor‘s role in a criminal prosecution is not to win a case, but 
rather, to ensure justice shall be done.
45
 
In regards to disclosing material evidence, the Supreme Court has 
consistently stressed that the prosecutor has a constitutional duty to ensure 
the accused receives a fair trial.
46
 Because of his control over evidence, 
                                                                                                                     
 37. See infra Part IV.A.  
 38. Burke, supra note 22, at 509. 
 39. See id. at 509–11. 
 40. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 41. Id.  
 42. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). 
 43. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (―A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.‖); ABA STANDARDS, supra 
note 11, § 3-1.2(c) (―The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.‖). 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–11 (1976) 
(―[T]here are situations in which evidence is obviously of such substantial value to the defense that 
elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without a specific request. For though the 
attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness and vigor, he must always be 
faithful to his client‘s overriding interest that ‗justice shall be done.‘ He is the ‗servant of the law, 
the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.‘ This description of the 
prosecutor‘s duty illuminates the standard of materiality that governs his obligation to disclose 
exculpatory evidence.‖ (internal citation omitted)); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963) 
(―We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. . . . Society wins not only when the 
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice 
suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.‖). 
6
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only the prosecutor can know what evidence is undisclosed.
47
 As a result, 
he has the sole responsibility to determine when disclosure is needed.
48
 ―It 
is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce 
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about 
a just one.‖49 
B.  The Duty to Disclose: The Material Evidence Standard and Its 
Evolution 
The Supreme Court first articulated a prosecutor‘s constitutional duty to 
disclose material evidence in Brady v. Maryland.
50
 The Court set forth a 
standard that required a prosecutor to turn over ―evidence favorable to an 
accused . . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment.‖51 The Court held that suppression of material evidence 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
52
 
Since Brady, the Supreme Court has elaborated on the prosecutor‘s 
obligation to disclose material evidence.
53
 In its most recent case, 
Strickler,
54
 the Court extracted the most relevant concepts from its five 
previous cases
55
 and provided a concise summary of what each contributed 
to the material evidence standard:  
 
[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable 
to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution. . . . [T]he duty to disclose such evidence is 
applicable even though there has been no request by the 
accused, and that the duty encompasses impeachment 
evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. Such evidence is 
material ―if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). Although there may be instances where the 
police may not pass along all the evidence to the prosecutor, in most instances, a prosecutor 
receives all the evidence the police uncover. Therefore, for the purposes of this Note, it will focus 
on the practical realities rather than the exception where the police hide unfavorable evidence from 
prosecutors. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 50. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 51. Id. In Brady, the prosecution turned over witness statements at the defense‘s request but 
withheld particular testimony of a companion who confessed to the actual killing. Only after the 
accused was tried, convicted, and sentenced was the confession discovered. Id. at 84.  
 52. Id. at 87. 
 53. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 
(1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682–84 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 
110–11 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1972). 
 54. Strickler, 527 U.S. 263. 
 55. Id. at 280–81; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110–
11; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
7
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proceeding would have been different.‖ Moreover, the rule 
encompasses evidence ―known only to police investigators 
and not to the prosecutor.‖ In order to comply with Brady, 
therefore, ―the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of 
any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government's behalf in this case, including the police.‖56 
 
After retracing the evolution of the material evidence standard, the 
Strickler Court articulated a three-prong standard.
57
 To qualify as material 
evidence: (1) ―[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, 
either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching‖; (2) the 
evidence must have been willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the state; 
and (3) ―prejudice must have ensued.‖58  
The Court, however, did not stop there. For the first time in thirty-five 
years, the Court added a bright-line rule to the standard.
59
 The Court 
determined that if a witness‘s trial testimony differs from his initial 
perceptions recorded in undisclosed documents, it would establish the 
material character of the documents.
60
 Strickler represented a substantial 
step forward because it enumerated a clear guideline that brought greater 
substance to the Court‘s standard.61 Although this is a step in the right 
direction, prosecutors still need additional bright-line rules to provide 
guidance for discharging their Brady obligations. 
C.  FRCRP: Discovery Rule 16 Omits the Material Evidence 
Standard 
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs discovery 
in federal criminal cases.
62
 In general, Rule 16 only requires prosecutors to 
disclose certain limited information at a defendant‘s request: oral 
statements made by the defendant,
63
 summaries of expert testimony,
64
 
copies of documents the government intends to use at trial,
65
 and reports of 
scientific tests and medical examinations.
66
 Although these minimal 
enumerated items represent a gradual expansion of the disclosure 
obligation, significant flaws still exist in the rule.
67
 First, this list of 
                                                                                                                     
 56. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280–81 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 
682; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 and citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107).  
 57. Id. at 281–82. 
 58. Id.   
 59. See id. at 295–96. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (2009). 
 63. Id. at 16(a)(1)(A). 
 64. Id. at 16(a)(1)(G). 
 65. Id. at 16(a)(1)(E). 
 66. Id. at 16(a)(1)(F). 
 67. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 102 (―Although Rule 16 has gradually 
expanded the scope of discovery required in criminal cases, it still does not require the government 
to timely disclose to the defendant favorable information that is material either to guilt or 
8
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discovery items is rather limited
68
 and fails to adequately address the 
considerable gaps in the standard.
69
 Secondly, Rule 16 completely omits 
the Brady material evidence standard.
70
 Even though the defense may try to 
file a Brady motion to permit additional discovery beyond Rule 16, the 
elusive scope of the standard often fails to unearth evidence critical to the 
defense.
71
  
Despite Rule 16‘s limited contribution to the standard, the Criminal 
Rules Advisory Committee has repeatedly considered whether to include a 
Brady amendment into the Federal Rules.
72
 Since the Supreme Court 
decided Brady in 1963, the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee has 
addressed changes to Rule 16 over forty separate times.
73
 Twenty-two of 
those occasions dealt directly with a Brady amendment.
74
 Of the Brady 
proposals, five occurred within the first five years of the Court‘s Brady 
opinion.
75
 The remaining seventeen occurred in the last six years to date.
76
 
1.  The Recent History: 2004–2010 
After an affirmative decision to keep a Brady amendment out of Rule 
16 in 1968, the Advisory Committee revisited the proposal for the first 
time in 2004.
77
 This resulted in the establishment of a subcommittee 
                                                                                                                     
sentencing. This limited disclosure makes the defense of a federal criminal case especially difficult, 
considering the government‘s ability to control the flow of information to the defendant . . . and the 
inability of the defense to compel disclosure.‖).  
 68. Id. at 101 (―Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provide for wide-ranging 
discovery and disclosure in the form of depositions, disclosure statements, requests for production, 
inspections and requests for admissions, interrogatories and expert reports, the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure afford the defendant extremely limited access to government information.‖). 
 69. See id. at 104 (―[The rule‘s] disclosure obligations neither define the nature and/or scope 
of favorable information, nor require consultation with law enforcement officers, nor do they 
provide clear pre-trial or pre-plea deadlines for disclosure.‖).  
 70. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (2009). 
 71. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 102–03. (―In addition to disclosure under 
Rule 16, criminal defense lawyers can try to obtain Brady and Giglio material by filing a motion 
with the court. . . . Brady-Giglio motions, however, often fail to unearth evidence that is critical to 
the defense [because] [f]ederal prosecutors, largely focusing on the word ‗exculpatory,‘ have 
interpreted the Brady disclosure obligation in a variety of ways.‖). 
 72. See Subcomm. on Rule 16 to the Advisory Comm. on the Criminal Rules, Comm. on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 111th Cong., Criminal 
Rules Committee Considered Proposed Amendment to Rule 16, Table of Contents (Comm. Print 
2009) [History of Rule 16 Amendments], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndP
olicies/rules/Rule%2016%20Table%20of%20Contents.pdf (summarizing previous committee 
meetings).    
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.; see infra notes 99 and 101 and accompanying text. 
 75. History of Rule 16 Amendments, supra note 72.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Meeting Minutes 8 
(Oct. 24–25, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule 
%2016%20Part%201.pdf. 
9
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dedicated to the efforts associated with a Brady amendment.
78
 ―At the 
subcommittee‘s request, the Federal Judicial Center compiled a survey of 
local rules, administrative orders, and relevant case law . . . .‖79 In April of 
2005, the subcommittee used the information from the study to present a 
preliminary draft of a Brady amendment to the Advisory Committee.
80
 The 
Advisory Committee subsequently voted 8-to-3 to endorse the amendment 
in principle but asked the subcommittee to continue its drafting efforts.
81
  
In April 2006, the Advisory Committee temporarily suspended its 
consideration of an amendment.
82
 The Advisory Committee wanted to give 
the drafters of the United States Attorneys‘ Manual (USAM) an 
opportunity to make the proposed change that would address a prosecutor‘s 
obligation to disclose material evidence.
83
 At its next meeting in 
September of 2006, frustrated with the slow progress of the USAM 
amendment, the Advisory Committee resumed its consideration even 
though the USAM process had not yet finished.
84
 The Advisory Committee 
approved a proposed amendment to Rule 16 codifying Brady and sent the 
proposal to the Standing Committee on Federal Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, recommending that it be published for public comment.
85
A 
month later, the Attorney General approved the USAM amendment, and  
although the Standing Committee recognized the positive benefits of a 
national uniform rule, it did not publish the amendment for public 
comment because it wanted to give the USAM changes enough time to 
have a measureable effect.
86
 The Standing Committee recommended that 
the Advisory Committee reexamine the language of the proposed 
amendment to ensure that it did not create too great a burden on the 
government.
87
 It also recommended that the Advisory Committee review 
the experiences of the courts with local rules on the same subject.
88
 
In April of 2007, the Advisory Committee requested an updated study 
of local rules, administrative orders, and case law from the Federal Judicial 
                                                                                                                     
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Meeting Minutes 10 
(Oct. 26–27, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule  
%2016%20Part%201.pdf. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Meeting Minutes 1–
7 (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%20  
16%20Part%201.pdf.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.; Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report Summary 9–10 
(Mar. 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%20 
16%20Part%201.pdf. 
 87. Judicial Conf. Comm on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report Summary 29 (Sept. 
2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%20P  
art%201.pdf. . 
 88. Id. 
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Center.
89
 After a brief two-month study, the Advisory Committee 
presented the research and a proposed amendment to the Standing 
Committee at its June 2007 meeting.
90
 The Standing Committee opposed 
immediate publication but did not reject the amendment entirely.
91
 It 
concluded, however, that further study should be methodically pursued.
92
 It 
recommended that the Advisory Committee research the impact of USAM 
changes and investigate the experience of courts governed by local orders 
similar to the proposed Brady amendment.
93
 
After eighteen months of little discussion, the most recent push for a 
Brady amendment came from the Honorable Emmet G. Sullivan in April 
2009.
94
 Judge Sullivan witnessed significant Department of Justice (DOJ)  
abuses of the Brady standard while presiding over United States v. 
Stevens.
95
 In October 2009,
96
 the Advisory Committee considered a request 
from Judge Sullivan to amend Federal Rule 16.
97
 The matter was referred 
to the newly reconstituted subcommittee on Rule 16 for further study, and 
a report was delivered to the Advisory Committee in April 2010.
98
 At the 
Advisory Committee‘s meeting on April 15–16, 2010, the Committee 
deferred action on enacting a Brady amendment for a later date.
99
 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Meeting Minutes 3 
(Apr. 16–17, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%  
2016%20Part%201.pdf; see also LAURAL HOOPER & SHELIA THORPE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BRADY V. 
MARYLAND MATERIAL IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS: RULES, ORDERS, AND POLICIES: 
REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (2007). 
 90. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Meeting Minutes 3 
(Apr. 16–17, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%  
2016%20Part%201.pdf; Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting 
Minutes 31–39 (June 11–12, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPo 
licies/rules/Rule%2016%20Part%201.pdf. 
 91. Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes 39 (June 11–
12, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%20  
Part%201.pdf 
 92. Id.  
 93. Judicial Conf. Comm on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report Summary 29 (Sept. 
2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%20  
Part%201.pdf. 
 94. Letter from Emmet G. Sullivan, U.S. Dist. Judge, D.C., to Richard C. Tallman, Chairman, 
Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure (Apr. 28, 2009), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CR%20Suggestions%202  
009/09-CR-A-Suggestion-Sullivan.pdf. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Letter from Richard C. Tallman, Chairman Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to Emmet G. Sullivan, U.S. Dist. Judge, D.C. (June 2, 2009), 
available at http://www.mainjustice.com/files/2009/07/tallman-ltr-to-sullivan.pdf. 
 97. Letter from Emmet G. Sullivan to Richard C. Tallman, supra note 94. 
 98. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, CRIMINAL RULES DOCKET 12, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/2010-CRDocket.pdf. 
 99. Id.; see also Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 7–8 
(Apr. 15–16, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Min 
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Currently, history is repeating itself as the most recent push for a Brady 
amendment to the Federal Criminal Rules has stalled again.  
One thing is clear from the present history: contentious and 
consequential issues still exist in regard to a Brady amendment.
100
 As for 
the DOJ‘s position, its new 2010 policy, enacted on January 4, 2010, 
adopts a ―multi-faceted approach‖ to the issue, again illustrating both the 
DOJ‘s strong opposition to a codified rule and its long held belief that 
internal guidance will work properly to protect defendants from 
prosecutorial abuse or bias.
101
 Others in opposition believe there is 
insufficient statistical evidence to require an external and independently 
enforced amendment to the Rule.
102
 Supporters of the amendment, 
however, respond that empirical data is difficult to collect.
103
 Many times, 
the defense will never discover that material evidence has been withheld.
104
 
In addition, they argue that an amendment would help ensure consistent 
application of the disclosure obligation.
105
 Of primary importance, an 
amendment must provide clear guidance as to prosecutors‘ discretion.106 
                                                                                                                     
utes/CR2010-04-min.pdf. 
 100. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 5 (Oct. 1–2, 2007), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%20Part%201.  
pdf. 
 101. Letter from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy U.S. Attorney Gen., to David F. Levi, Judge, U.S. E. 
Dist. Court of Calif. 5 (June 5, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd 
Policies/rules/Rule%2016%20Part%201.pdf; see Memorandum from David G. Odgen, Deputy 
Attorney Gen., to U.S. Dep‘t of Justice Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/discovery-guidance.html. The DOJ‘s ―multi-faceted approach‖ 
emphasizes ―training, guidance, strong leadership, and more uniformity.‖ Judicial Conf. Advisory 
Comm on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 6 (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts. 
gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR10-2009-min.pdf. The Department‘s approach 
includes a requirement that all federal prosecutors undergo discovery training, a requirement that 
each U.S. Attorney‘s Office designate an expert on discovery to advise prosecutors on individual 
cases, and the creation of a new position will be to oversee all of these changes. Id. The DOJ has 
also talked about creating an on-line database of material on Brady issues and is considering 
developing a manual to exclusively outline disclosure obligations. Id.  
Although the DOJ‘s opposition to a codified rule can be inferred from its new 2010 policy, the 
Department has explicitly objected to a codified rule for years. See, e.g., id. at 6; History of Rule 16 
Amendments, supra note 72, at 2–3. 
 102. Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Meeting Minutes 7 (Oct. 30, 
2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%20 
Part%201.pdf. 
 103. Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes 37 (June 11–
12, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%  
20Part%201.pdf. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Letter from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy U.S. Attorney Gen., to David F. Levi, Judge, U.S. E. 
Dist. Court of Calif. 11 (June 5, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd 
Policies/rules/Rule%2016%20Part%201.pdf. 
 106. Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes 35 (June 11–
12, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%20 
Part%201.pdf 
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Not only would courts be more likely to enforce an objectively enumerated 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, supporters argue, but without a new 
codified rule, prosecutors may treat their current case law-based disclosure 
obligations as of secondary importance to the explicit discovery obligations 
found in Rule 16.
107
  
Spurred by the Advisory Committee reconvening to debate the issue 
once again,
108
 this Note attempts to explain the inherent structural 
problems of the current standard, suggest the principal ways codification 
would address some of the structural issues, and offer some effective 
solutions as to how that codification could take place. 
III.  UNCLEAR LINES: A STANDARD WITHOUT RULES 
At the heart of the current problem, Rule 16 and the Supreme Court fail 
to provide guidance to prosecutors for applying the Brady standard.
109
 
Individual prosecutors are left to their own judgment to fill in the gaps of 
the standard by determining what constitutes ―material evidence.‖110 
Without clear guidelines, prosecutors determine materiality issues by 
relying heavily on a case-specific analysis.
111
 An exclusive case-specific 
analysis,
112
 what Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski terms ―an insider 
perspective,‖113 leaves prosecutors more susceptible to the cognitive biases 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 104 (―In the absence of a procedural rule 
containing a clear definition of Brady material, requiring prosecutors to consult with law 
enforcement officers, and mandating a firm compliance timetable, the duty to disclose favorable 
information has become blurred and, at best, of secondary importance to the explicit discovery 
obligations and procedures found in Rule 16.‖). 
 108. Justice Department Opposes Expanded Brady Rule, MAIN JUSTICE, Oct. 15, 2009, 
http://www.mainjustice.com/2009/10/15/justice-department-opposes-expanded-brady-rule/ (―The 
advisory committee meets again in April and could vote to open Sullivan‘s proposal to six-month 
public comment period. The standing committee meets in January, at which time the department is 
expected to provide a fuller picture of its efforts.‖). 
 109. Peter A. Joy, Brady and Jailhouse Informants: Responding to Injustice, 57 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 619, 635 (2007) (―The lack of written policies for exercising discretion and the lack of 
transparency in the process are breeding grounds for inconsistency and potential arbitrariness in the 
way prosecutors in an office approach their work.‖). 
 110. Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of 
Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 562–63 (―Irrespective of all these rules [Rule 16 
and the Constitution], gaps exist with respect to the prosecutor‘s duty to provide 
discovery. . . . [P]rosecutors fill in the gap by considering broader concerns for a fair and 
expeditious process.‖). 
 111. Joy, supra note 109, at 636 (―Without written policies, the prosecutors making these 
decisions are left to determine, on their own, the proper way of handling a situation . . . .‖). 
 112. ―Exclusive case-specific analysis‖ in this context is an approach to determining 
materiality issues by focusing on the relative comparison of in-case facts to one another while 
giving little attention to the comparison of facts across cases. A prosecutor that uses case-specific 
analysis will evaluate evidence within the context of the other facts in the case. This approach is 
highly associated with determining prejudice in material evidence cases. In contrast, an ―across-case 
comparison‖ is an approach to determining materiality issues by focusing on the comparative 
similarities among facts from other cases. See generally infra note 111. 
 113. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 
13
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that affect disclosure decisions.
114
 
A.  Cognitive Bias Results in Under-Disclosure 
Cognitive bias inherent in the human thought process presents a 
dangerous impediment to a defendant‘s access to material evidence.115 
Problematically, the current material evidence standard fails to counteract 
the known presence of cognitive bias inherent in its current structure.
116
 As 
a result, the criminal justice system risks the wrongful conviction of 
innocent defendants.
117
  
Studies in human nature reveal that the cognitive biases in the 
decisionmaking process not only make it difficult to identify materiality 
issues, but once material issues are identified, cognitive bias leads to 
unintentional undervaluing of the evidence.
118
 Confirmation bias,
119
 
selective information processing,
120
 and resistance to cognitive 
dissonance
121
 are all forms of cognitive bias that are amplified by the 
current standard. The present standard, as it stands, unnecessarily subjects 
innocent defendants to a process that provides no correction for these 
known cognitive biases.
122
 
                                                                                                                     
OR. L. REV. 61, 65–66 (2000).  
 114. Id. ―This insider perspective makes it difficult to identify cognitive illusions that might 
affect judgment.‖ Id. Psychologists recognize a distinction between insider perspectives and 
outsider perspectives in that cognitive bias has less of an impact on outsider perspectives: ―[P]eople 
can more easily identify cognitive biases when they treat a decision-making problem as one of a 
class of similar problems that many other people face than when they treat it as a unique problem 
that they face alone.‖ Id. at 65.  
 115. See Burke, supra note 22, at 494 (―[The] materiality standard amounts not simply to a 
challenging doctrine, under which prosecutors are just as likely to misapply the standard in one 
direction as the other. Instead, the doctrine acts upon cognitive biases from which prosecutors, like 
all human decision makers, suffer. . . . [I]n applying Bagley‘s materiality standard, [prosecutors] 
will do so by systematically underestimating, not overestimating, materiality.‖). 
 116. Id. at 499 (―[T]he Court‘s standard of materiality invites prosecutors to systematically 
undervalue it. Because of cognitive biases, prosecutors will overestimate the strength of their case 
in the absence of the evidence at issue, underestimate the potentially exculpatory value of the 
evidence, and therefore fail to recognize materiality even when it exists.‖). 
 117. Id. at 510–11 (―The Brady doctrine has failed to accomplish its objective of providing 
defendants access to material exculpatory evidence, and the costs of that failure are borne . . . by the 
innocent.‖). 
 118. Id. at 499.  
 119. Burke, supra note 22, at 495. For a detailed analysison the effects of confirmation bias, 
see Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping, 63 FLA. L. 
REV. 129, 142–43 & n.96 (2011).  
 120. Burke, supra note 22, at 495 (―Selective information processing is the tendency for 
people to accept at face value information that is consistent with their existing beliefs, while 
devaluing inconsistent information.‖). 
 121. Id. at 495–96. 
 122. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 322 (―But the innateness of these cognitive 
biases . . . demands that we become aware of [the] cognitive processes and the tunnel vision they 
produce, and that we search for ways to neutralize them. Unfortunately, the criminal justice system 
14
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1.  Confirmation Bias 
Confirmation bias affects a prosecutor‘s collection of evidence.123 
Confirmation biases are errors in information processing that lead humans 
to collect evidence in a manner that tends to confirm their hypotheses, 
independently of whether they are true or not.
124
 Confirmation bias 
research reveals that human reasoning unintentionally favors evidence that 
confirms one‘s working hypothesis.125 Thus, in the course of acquiring 
knowledge, humans subconsciously seek information in a way that leads 
them to collect data that reflect one‘s viewpoint.126 Professor Alafair S. 
Burke explains the impact of confirmation bias on a prosecutor: 
 
When a prosecutor initially reviews a case file, she does so 
to test the hypothesis that the defendant is guilty. Because 
of confirmation bias, she is likely to search the 
investigative file for evidence that confirms the defendant‘s 
guilt to the detriment of any exculpatory evidence that 
might disprove the working hypothesis. She may, for 
example, take note of the defendant‘s confession without 
questioning the circumstances under which it was elicited 
or a lack of self-verifying detail within the confession. She 
might search for a positive identification by an eyewitness 
without scrutinizing the reliability of the procedure used to 
obtain the identification.
127
  
 
While simple awareness of cognitive bias may ease its effect, it is 
impossible to wholly eliminate cognitive bias from the decisionmaking 
process.
128
  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
fails to do that. Rather, both institutional pressures inherent in the adversary system and explicit 
policy choices reinforce and exacerbate [their] natural tendencies . . . .‖). 
 123. Barbara O‘Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate and 
Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y. & L. 315, 316–
18 (2009).  
 124. See John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 
in STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE: ESSENTIAL READINGS 212, 212 (Charles Stangor ed., 2000); Burke, 
supra note 22, at 495. 
 125. Burke, supra note 22, at 495.  
 126. Id. (―For example, researchers have found that subjects asked to determine whether a 
person is an extrovert ask questions such as, ‗What would you do if you wanted to liven things up at 
a party?‘ Any answer to this question could only support, and never disprove, the theory that the 
person being questioned was an extrovert.‖). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Findley & Scott, supra note 122, at 371 (―The challenge is [that] the cognitive biases that 
contribute to the problem are not easily suppressed by self-awareness, training, or practice. 
Unfortunately, research suggests that merely informing people about a cognitive bias, or urging a 
person to overcome the bias, is to some degree ineffective.‖); Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 99 
(―The bias cannot be eliminated by warning people about the influence of the bias.‖). 
15
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2.  Selective Information Processing 
―Once the prosecutor has conducted a search of the file and determined 
that the defendant is guilty, he becomes subject to selective information 
processing. Selective information processing is the tendency of people to 
accept at face value information that is consistent with their existing 
beliefs, while devaluing inconsistent information.‖129 As Burke describes, 
if a prosecutor believes that a defendant is guilty, she will unintentionally 
―give more weight to evidence that buttresses her existing beliefs than to 
contradictory evidence.‖130 Selective information processing reinforces 
existing beliefs by the subconscious selective favoring of information 
consistent with those beliefs.
131
 ―In other words, [a prosecutor] will accept 
at face value any new inculpatory evidence, [such as] the testimony of an 
additional witness against the defendant, but she is likely to cast aside 
potentially exculpatory evidence as unreliable or irrelevant, such as 
evidence suggesting that the witness may be biased.‖132 
3.  Cognitive Dissonance 
―A prosecutor‘s evaluation of [material evidence] may also be skewed 
by a resistance to cognitive dissonance.‖133 The cognitive dissonance 
literature demonstrates that people have an instinctive drive to reduce 
dissonance by seeking ways to justify or rationalize their beliefs in light of 
contrary evidence.
134
 Burke suggests: 
 
[H]ow this phenomenon might apply to a prosecutor who 
[brought] charges against a defendant only to be confronted 
later with evidence suggesting the defendant‘s innocence. 
To avoid the cognitive dissonance . . . [a] prosecutor is 
likely to discount the exculpatory value of the new evidence 
and overestimate the strength of her original case against 
the defendant.
135
  
 
Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that humans will rationalize and 
justify existing beliefs even in light of explicit evidence to the contrary.
136
  
As this research suggests, a completely objective analysis is virtually 
impossible due to cognitive human behavior.
137
 Cognitive bias 
                                                                                                                     
 129. Burke, supra note 22, at 495. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Jane L. Risen & Thomas Gilovich, Informal Logical Fallacies, in CRITICAL THINKING IN 
PSYCHOLOGY 110, 121 (Robert J. Sternberg, Henry L. Roediger III & Diane F. Halpern eds., 2007).  
 132. Burke, supra note 22, at 495.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 495–96. 
 135. Id. at 496. 
 136. Id. at 495–96. 
 137. Findley & Scott, supra note 122, at 307–08. In referring to the product of these cognitive 
16
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substantially impacts prosecutorial discretion.
138
 Not only does cognitive 
bias affect how prosecutors gather information, but it also affects what 
weight they give to the information they collect, and subsequently, how 
they instinctively rationalize and justify their existing beliefs even in light 
of explicit contrary evidence.
139
 Ultimately, because our present material 
standard fails to recognize or counteract these cognitive biases, the current 
structure invites cognitive error.
140
 Because of cognitive biases, when 
prosecutors err in applying the standard, they tend to underestimate, not 
overestimate, materiality.
141
  
B.  Uncovering Under-Disclosure: The Sources of Cognitive Bias 
As noted, the structure of the current system leaves wide discretion in 
the hands of the prosecutor.
142
 In applying a standard, broad discretion 
when combined with a lack of guidance results in a lack of uniformity.
143
 
In the absence of uniform disclosure rules across circuits, prosecutors are 
essentially the ones who make the discretionary case-by-case determination 
of whether evidence is material.
144
 Therefore, the prosecutors, rather than 
                                                                                                                     
biases as ―tunnel vision,‖ Professors Keith Findley and Michael Scott note: ―The tendency toward 
tunnel vision is . . . innate; it is part of our psychological makeup. . . . [It] is so ubiquitous, even 
among well meaning actors in the criminal justice system.‖ Id. The undeniable presence of these 
cognitive biases is so pervasive that Findley and Scott term the phenomena ―[t]he inevitability of 
tunnel vision.‖ Id. at 396.  
 138. See id. at 307–08, 395–97; Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 102. For empirical data on the 
subject, see O‘Brien, supra note 123, at 318–31.  
 139. Burke, supra note 22, at 494–96. For further discussion of how a prosecutor‘s office 
environment magnifies the effect of cognitive bias on individuals, see Andrew E. Taslitz, 
Eyewitness Identification, Democratic Deliberation, and the Politics of Science, 4 CARDOZO  PUB. 
L. POL‘Y & ETHICS J. 271, 310 (2006) (arguing that ―group dynamics‖ of a prosecutor‘s office 
exacerbate individual cognitive bias). 
 140. See Burke, supra note 22, at 494–96; Findley & Scott, supra note 122, at 395–97; 
Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 102; see also O‘Brien, supra note 123, at 316–18. 
 141. Burke, supra note 22, at 499 (―The Brady doctrine has failed to live up to its vision of 
providing defendants access to exculpatory evidence. . . . [T]he Court‘s standard of materiality 
invites prosecutors to systematically undervalue it. Because of cognitive biases, prosecutors will 
overestimate the strength of their case in the absence of the evidence at issue, underestimate the 
potentially exculpatory value of the evidence, and therefore fail to recognize materiality even when 
it exists.‖). 
 142. See Melanie D. Wilson, Prosecutors “Doing Justice” Through Osmosis —Reminders to 
Encourage a Culture of Cooperation, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 87 (2008) ( ―Federal prosecutors 
wield broad discretion with little guidance . . . .‖).  
 143. Joy, supra note 109, at 630 (―Under Brady . . . the prosecutor has the discretion to 
determine what constitutes exculpatory evidence and when to disclose it. This has led to 
inconsistent decisions with some prosecutors turning over to defendants material other prosecutors 
fail to disclose . . . .‖). See generally Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of 
Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1517 (2000) (―In not providing 
guidance that is specific to a case . . . consistency in the decision-making process is not achieved.‖). 
 144. Joy, supra note 109, 630–31 (―Under Brady . . . the prosecutor has the discretion to 
determine what constitutes exculpatory evidence and when to disclose it . . . . The prosecutor makes 
these decisions secretly, usually based on personal judgment, and those decisions are not subject to 
17
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the courts, fill in the gaps of the material evidence standard.
145
 With a 
plethora of cases available to choose from, it is easy to see how prosecutors 
in different jurisdictions with substantially similar facts can come to vastly 
different conclusions about whether evidence is material.
146
 Even though 
factual consistencies across cases exist,
147
 rather than compiling a cohesive 
body of law, prosecutors narrowly focus on the word ―exculpatory,‖ 
interpret Brady in a variety of ways, and selectively choose cases to define 
the lines of the standard for the purpose of their instant case.
148
 
Accordingly, the material evidence standard suffers from a lack of 
coherence, consistency, and uniformity in its application.
149
 The lack of 
uniformity and the absence of objective guidelines leave defendants 
vulnerable to the effects of cognitive bias on the decisionmaking 
process.
150
 
C.  Attacking the Source: Adding an Across-Case Component to 
Case-Specific Analysis 
The inherent problem in the structure of the current standard is its over-
emphasis on a case-specific analysis.
151
 Rather than encompassing factual 
                                                                                                                     
any established oversight mechanisms.‖). 
 145. Levenson, supra note 110, at 562 (describing a prosecutor‘s gap-filling function in 
deciding what charges to bring). ―[G]aps exist with respect to the prosecutor‘s duty to provide 
discovery.‖ Id. ―[T]he role of the prosecutor is to fill the gaps . . . [by] exercising their judgment.‖ 
Id. A ―clear[ ] example of a prosecutor‘s responsibility to fill in the gaps in the rules is a 
prosecutor‘s duty to provide discovery to the defense.‖ Id.  
 146. Joy, supra note 109, at 630. 
 147. See infra Part IV. 
 148. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 94, 103–04 (―With neither a clear definition 
of favorable evidence nor a disclosure timetable, prosecutors have interpreted the constitutional 
discovery obligation inconsistently . . . . Federal prosecutors, largely focusing on the word 
‗exculpatory,‘ have interpreted the Brady disclosure obligation in a variety of ways. A number of 
prosecutors have interpreted Brady narrowly and believe that a prosecutor‘s Brady obligation is 
limited solely to turning over information that someone other than the defendant has confessed to 
the crime at issue. Many prosecutors do not focus on the critical language of the Brady decision, 
which requires disclosure of evidence that tends to exculpate or reduce one‘s penalty. Others, 
knowing of favorable evidence, have tried to predict its effect on the outcome of the case in 
deciding whether to disclose. Still others do not view Giglio or impeachment material as part of the 
Brady exculpatory disclosure obligation. And yet others have separated the timing of the disclosure 
of exculpatory or guilt-related evidence from the disclosure of mitigating or punishment-related 
evidence.‖). 
 149. Id.; Albert D. Brault & Timothy F. Maloney, Editorial, A Standard for Fair Trials, WASH. 
POST., May 17, 2009, at A23 (―A 2007 study by the Federal Judicial Center found widespread 
inconsistencies in how courts interpret which evidence is favorable to the accused, when it must be 
disclosed and how much effort prosecutors must make to find it.‖). See generally FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., supra note 89, at 7–21.  
 150. See supra Part III.A; see also Burke, supra note 22, at 499; supra note 148 and 
accompanying text.  
 151. Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing Prosecutors’ Ethics Codes, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 
470 (2009) (arguing that the current standard ―fails to provide explicit guidance on the need to look 
at conduct beyond an examination of a specific set of facts‖ and as a consequence, the standard 
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss3/6
2011] AMENDING FOR JUSTICE’S SAKE: CODIFIED DISCLOSURE RULE 789 
 
concepts that can apply across cases to determine whether the evidence is 
material, the current standard leads prosecutors to exclusively compare 
facts in the case with other facts from the same case.
152
 Rachlinski terms 
this tendency the ―insider perspective.‖153 A prosecutor who takes an 
―insider perspective‖ will over-emphasize case-specific analysis when 
examining whether evidence is material.
154
 As Rachlinski explains, an 
―insider perspective‖ is an adoption of an inside view of a problem, where 
a person treats the decisionmaking process as a unique experience that she 
faces alone.
155
 An ―outsider perspective,‖ on the other hand, takes an 
external, holistic view of a problem.
156
A person takes an ―outsider 
perspective‖ when she treats a decisionmaking problem as one of a class of 
similar problems that many others face.
157
 Applying these paradigms to the 
law, a prosecutor with an ―insider perspective‖ places a heavy emphasis on 
case-specific analysis,
158
 whereas a prosecutor with an ―outsider 
perspective‖ places an emphasis on a comparative across-case analysis159 
when approaching materiality issues. 
Obviously, a case-specific analysis is inherently necessary to the 
concept of materiality, especially with the materiality standard‘s emphasis 
on prejudice.
160
 It is a necessary requirement because in order to be 
material, the evidence must be prejudicial.
161
 In order to be prejudicial, the 
evidence must affect the outcome of the case.
162
 To determine whether 
evidence affects the outcome of the case, the specific facts of a case have 
to be examined in relation to one another.
163
 Even though this type of 
analysis is necessary, however, it is not sufficient when performed alone.
164
  
Some commentators have recognized that when a prosecutor over-
emphasizes case-specific analysis, he is most susceptible to cognitive 
                                                                                                                     
suffers from a ―one-dimensional consideration of a single case‖). 
 152. Cf. Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 66. Id. Other commentators have also recognized this 
inherent problem, although each has his or her own term to describe it. Findley & Scott, supra note 
122, at 307–08, 349 (labeling the problem as ―tunnel vision‖ to be resolved by implementing 
elements from ―outside the tunnel‖); Podgor, supra note 151, at 470 (referring to the problem as a 
―one-dimensional consideration of a single case‖ and extolling the need for additional rule-based 
safeguards against bias); Taslitz, supra note 139, at 325 (identifying the problem as ―internal 
deliberation‖ to be cured by ―external deliberations‖). 
 153. Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 66. 
 154. See id. at 100. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. A case-specific analysis examines evidence by looking at facts within the case and 
comparing them to other facts in the same case.  
 159. An across-case analysis examines evidence by comparing the immediate case facts to the 
facts in other cases. 
 160. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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bias.
165
 Ultimately, an exclusive in-case comparison roots the prosecutor‘s 
discretion solely in relativity.
166
 This type of exclusive case-specific 
analysis, therefore, eliminates the potential to identify factual concepts, 
situations, or patterns across cases that can bring objective guidelines to the 
standard.
167
 Consequentially, an absence of objective guidelines increases 
the possibility that cognitive bias will creep into the decisionmaking 
process.
168
 To ameliorate cognitive bias, therefore, the standard must also 
include an across-case comparison that can base discretion within objective 
guidelines. 
Accordingly, an effective definition of material requires a two-step 
inquiry. First, the in-case inquiry must ask how the evidence relates to the 
other facts in the case. Second, an across-case inquiry must ask how the 
evidence relates to factual concepts and situations of other disclosure 
cases. This type of workable and effective concept of materiality provides 
clear guidance by grounding prosecutorial discretion in the objective 
markers of other cases and, subsequently, limits the effects of cognitive 
bias. 
By introducing objective guidelines from across-case similarities, we 
are able to provide guidance to prosecutors. No longer would a prosecutor 
be left to his own discretion and focus exclusively on how in-case facts 
relate.
 
Rather, he has objective markers on which to compare the facts of 
his case to the facts of other cases. Consequentially, the chance that the 
prosecutor can be unknowingly influenced by cognitive bias is reduced. 
Objective markers will help draw prosecutors‘ attention to material 
tendencies, and accordingly, will help counteract the cognitive bias that 
takes place when comparing, examining, and synthesizing in-case facts. 
Currently, the present standard‘s prejudice requirement incorporates the 
case-specific analysis.
169
 The across-case comparison, however, is not 
included in the present standard.
170
 A codified Strickler three-prong 
standard that enumerates precedential-based, bright-line rules would 
effectively incorporate an across-case comparison. Therefore, by 
identifying and enumerating specific scenarios from the case law that are 
highly suggestive of materiality, we can accomplish this two-part inquiry to 
determine whether evidence is material.
171
 We can create a set of 
enumerated objective rules that provides guidance to prosecutorial 
discretion by extracting the common principles across material evidence 
cases.
172
  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 165. See supra note 152.  
 166. See supra note 152. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). 
 170. See id. 
 171. See infra Part IV.  
 172. See infra Part IV. 
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IV.  A NEEDED SOLUTION: PROVIDING CLEAR LINES FOR 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
A.  Bright-Line Rules Bring Guidance to the Standard 
Given cognitive bias concerns, Congress should institute bright-line 
rules for prosecutorial disclosure in future cases that mirror factual 
scenarios where the Supreme Court has already found similar evidence 
material.
173
 A comprehensive review of the case law provides the types of 
situations that should trigger disclosure: 
(1) Promises of immunity or favorable government treatment of 
witnesses;
174
 
(2) Prior inconsistent statements of government witnesses 
regarding defendant‘s criminal conduct;175 
(3) ―Prior perjury or false testimony of government witness‖;176 
(4) Monetary rewards or inducements of key government 
witnesses;
177
 
(5) ―Confessions to the crime in question by others‖;178 
(6) Information reflecting bias or prejudice by government witness 
against defendant; 
(7) ―Witness statements that others committed crime in 
question‖;179 
                                                                                                                     
 173. There is recognition among commentators that the current standard is susceptible to 
cognitive bias because of an over-reliance on case-specific analysis and that inserting objective 
external elements would help ameliorate bias. See supra Part III.C.  
 174. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (finding that the prosecution‘s failure to 
disclose immunity promised to the government‘s crucial witness, which was relevant to his 
credibility, was a violation of due process and justified a new trial); Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, 
supra note 20, at 103 & n.57. 
 175. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 103 & nn.58–59. 
 176. Id. at 103; see Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441–43 (1995) (finding a Brady violation 
when prosecution suppressed original statements given to police from its ―two best witnesses,‖ 
which differed drastically from the witnesses‘ testimony on the stand explaining the sequence of 
events, description of the killer, and the type of car with ―detailed clarity‖); United States v. Arnold, 
117 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1110–11 (11th Cir. 
1995); DeMarco v. United States, 928 F.2d 1074, 1077 (11th Cir. 1991) (vacating defendant‘s 
conviction where the prosecutor failed to correct the government‘s essential witness‘s perjured 
testimony that he would receive nothing in exchange for his testimony); United States v. Stevens, 
593 F. Supp. 2d 177, 178, 182 (D.D.C. 2009) (chronicling a pattern of government failure to turn 
over exculpatory evidence). 
 177. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 674–78 (2004) (finding that the prosecution suppressed 
evidence about key witnesses status as a paid informant, which would have severely undermined his 
credibility); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683–84 (1985) (reversing and remanding 
because the prosecution failed to disclose that the key witnesses were paid for their testimony); Am. 
Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 103. 
 178. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 103; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83, 86 (1963) (finding that the prosecution‘s suppression of a confession by defendant‘s accomplice 
to the actual act of killing was a violation of due process).  
 179. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 103; see also United States v. Robinson, 39 
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(8) ―Information about mental or physical impairments of 
government witnesses‖;180 
(9) ―Inconsistent or contradictory examinations of scientific 
tests‖;181 and 
(10) Failure of witness to make positive identification of the 
defendant.
182
 
 
These enumerated scenarios serve as the objective markers of the 
―outsider perspective.‖ Enumerating these salient facts forces prosecutors 
to compare facts across cases. An across-case comparison counteracts the 
cognitive bias in the decisionmaking process. Accordingly, these 
enumerated scenarios bring the type of ―outsider perspective‖183 that 
provides guidance to prosecutorial discretion. 
If prosecutors are going to continue to play a crucial role in our criminal 
justice system, we need to recognize the structural weaknesses that prevent 
them from doing justice.
184
 No matter how objectively one may try to 
analyze a situation, a mind is inherently biased in its analysis.
185
 Therefore, 
we can better achieve justice by introducing objective guidelines and self-
correcting restraints into an inherently biased cognitive process.
186
 By 
using these enumerated scenarios as bright-line rules that require 
disclosure, the new standard would introduce the type of objectivity that 
would help mitigate the influence of cognitive biases on prosecutors‘ 
disclosure decisions.
187
 
B.  A Codification Solution 
The Advisory Committee should recommend that Congress codify these 
enumerated scenarios into Rule 16 of the Federal Criminal Rules. Even if 
the enumerated scenarios are codified, however, it will be up to the 
Advisory Committee to determine what type of impact the enumerated 
                                                                                                                     
F.3d 1115, 1118–19 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding the order for a new trial when defendant was 
convicted of distributing cocaine but the government failed to disclose testimony from a 
codefendant that another former codefendant was the drug courier responsible for the crime).  
 180. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 103 & n.60. 
 181. Id. at 103 & n.61. 
 182. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 445 (1995) (―[T]he effective impeachment of one 
eyewitness can call for a new trial . . . .‖); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (finding 
that reliability depends in part on the accuracy of prior description); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 
199–200 (1972) (finding that reliability of identification following impermissibly suggestive lineup 
depends in part on accuracy of witness‘s prior description); Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 
20, at 103; see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 444 (finding the identification by the prosecution‘s ―two best 
witnesses‖ would have been severely undermined by use of the witnesses‘ suppressed statements).  
 183. See Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 66. 
 184. Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena’s D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 395–96 (2009) (arguing that external deliberation is needed to check 
internal deliberation). 
 185. Burke, supra note 22, at 494–96. 
 186. See id. 
 187. Id. at 509. 
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across-case facts should have on the prosecutor‘s duty. The Committee 
could choose to treat them either: (1) as bright-line rules, which would 
require mandatory disclosure; (2) as prompting an in-camera discussion of 
materiality;
188
 or (3) as favorable evidence, warranting disclosure if the the 
evidence is prejudicial.
189
  
1.  Bright-Line Rule Approach 
This Note advocates for a bright-line rule approach. Under a bright-line 
rule approach, the presence of an enumerated scenario would qualify as a 
de facto finding of material evidence, necessitating disclosure.  
The Committee should adopt the enumerated scenarios as bright-line 
rules, not because all enumerated scenarios in every situation will be 
material, but because something more than a pronouncement of the 
standard is necessary to limit the effects of cognitive bias on the criminal 
justice system.
190
 In numerous other criminal procedure situations, there 
are clear preferences for objective rules instead of subjective standards.
191
 
For example, the Court has carved out per se rules rendering searches of 
automobiles reasonable, not because exigent circumstances would justify 
the government‘s conduct in every such case, but because of the belief that 
there will be exigent circumstances in enough of the cases to justify the 
rule.
192
 This should also be the case with prosecutorial disclosure.
193
 The 
justification for mandatory disclosure rules in federal criminal cases is that 
the mere presence of an enumerated scenario—whether actually material or 
not—has a substantial probability of affecting the outcome of a case, a 
probability that should not be left to the prosecutor alone to weigh. 
Accordingly, a bright-line rule approach would effectively confine 
prosecutorial discretion within substantive, clear lines. Having these 
                                                                                                                     
 188. This Note will not discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of an in camera 
solution. For a discussion of an in-camera approach, see Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory 
Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 
FORDHAM L. REV. 391 (1984). In addition to an in-camera solution, other commentators have 
recommended countering cognitive bias through open-file discovery. For an approach that proposes 
a prophylactic rule requiring prosecution to turn over all evidence, see generally Burke, supra note 
22. For further discussion of open-file discovery and its implementation in the State Criminal Rules 
of North Carolina, see Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the 
Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 257 (2008). 
 189. For an example of how enumerated scenarios can be used more clearly to define the 
favorable evidence prong of the material evidence standard, see Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra 
note 20, at 101–04. 
 190. See Burke, supra note 22, at 508; Bennet L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. 
Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 688 (2006) (―[I]t is readily apparent that Brady violations are 
among the most pervasive and recurring types of prosecutorial violations.‖); Janet C. Hoeffel, 
Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
1133, 1148 (2005) (―Withholding favorable evidence . . . seems to be the norm.‖). 
 191. Burke, supra note 22, at 508. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 509.  
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objective markers will counter inevitable bias in the human 
decisionmaking process. Not only would a bright-line rule bring needed 
clarity to disclosure, but it would also promote administrative efficiency 
and ensure a more consistent application of the current standard. 
Furthermore, while it may not deter all appellate litigation, it would 
undeniably reduce the number of appeals falling under these enumerated 
scenarios. Accordingly, requiring mandatory disclosure of an enumerated 
scenario will help eliminate prosecutors‘ disparate interpretations of the 
material evidence standard, it will provide  prosecutors clear guidance of 
when evidence is ―material,‖ and ultimately, it will promote equal 
treatment of similarly situated defendants under the law.
194
 
2.  Heightened Favorable Evidence Approach 
Alternatively, if the Committee decides not to adopt a bight-line rule 
approach, the Committee should adopt a heightened favorable evidence 
approach. Under a heightened favorable evidence approach, the presence 
of an enumerated scenario would qualify as a de facto finding of favorable 
evidence, requiring disclosure if prejudice exists.   
Arguably, this approach provides more guidance than the current 
standard because it brings prosecutors‘ attention to specifically enumerated 
scenarios. At the same time, the enumerated scenarios fit hand and glove 
with the Court‘s understanding of favorable evidence as most recently 
articulated in Strickler.
195
 Although material evidence and favorable 
evidence often have been used interchangeably, Strickler clearly 
distinguished the two.
196
 In Strickler, the Court asserted that three 
components made up Brady‘s material evidence standard.197 The first of 
these components was favorable evidence.
198
 Rather than another term for 
material evidence, favorable evidence is a distinct type of evidence.
199
 
When combined with prejudice and suppression, favorable evidence 
becomes material evidence.
200
  
In essence, the Court in Strickler explained that favorable evidence 
tends to suggest materiality, but unlike material evidence, favorable 
evidence falls just short of indicating prejudice on its own.
201
 With such an 
                                                                                                                     
 194. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 115 (explaining that enumerated factors will 
provide the type of guidance to a prosecutor‘s disclosure decisions that ―will help eliminate 
disparate interpretations of the Brady obligation by both prosecutors and defense counsel and give 
prosecutors clear guidance, thereby promoting equal treatment of similarly situated defendants 
under the law‖).  
 195. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. The Supreme Court held that evidence is ―material‖ if it is: (1) favorable to the 
accused; (2) willfully or inadvertently suppressed; and (3) prejudicial. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. From the Court‘s definition of material, favorable evidence is something much stronger 
than relevant evidence. The Court did not define the first prong of material evidence as simply any 
evidence. Its deliberate choice not to do so indicates that favorable evidence must be more than any 
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understanding in mind, the material standard would be clarified by listing 
the enumerated scenarios as instances of favorable evidence.
202
 Just as 
favorable evidence tends to suggest materiality, the occurrence of an 
enumerated scenario also tends to suggest materiality.
203
 Essentially, the 
presence of an enumerated scenario, though not material in itself, places 
the prosecutor on notice of likely material evidence. Therefore, listing 
numerous instances of favorable evidence in a codified rule would 
specifically alert a prosecutor to the most generic instances that normally 
require disclosure and would give a prosecutor a heightened awareness for 
when material evidence may be present. This heightened awareness would 
help prevent cognitive bias from creeping into a prosecutor‘s 
decisionmaking process by grounding a prosecutor‘s discretion in 
these enumerated across-case facts.
204
 Although treatment of the 
enumerated scenarios as a heightened awareness of favorable evidence 
would not limit discretion as much as a bright-line rule, it still helps 
ameliorate the cognitive bias problem.
205
 Moreover, by using the 
enumerated scenarios as heightened favorable evidence, Brady‘s and 
Strickler‘s distinction between material evidence and favorable evidence is 
preserved.
206
  
Whether a bright-line rule or a favorable evidence approach is taken 
with regard to the enumerated scenarios, both make materiality a two-part 
inquiry and bring an ―outsider perspective‖ to prosecutorial discretion.207 
In addition to case-specific analysis, both approaches force an across-case 
fact comparison, which helps ground prosecutorial discretion in objective 
markers.
208
 In turn, these objective guidelines help counteract the present 
standard‘s inherent cognitive bias.209 By limiting the cognitive bias that 
leads to unintentional under-disclosure, a codification of the enumerated 
scenarios will help criminal prosecutors better understand their disclosure 
responsibilities, will instill far greater confidence that the rules are being 
                                                                                                                     
relevant piece of evidence. However, favorable evidence falls short of material evidence and is 
distinct from material evidence because it lacks an element of prejudice. Favorable evidence fails to 
indicate prejudice on its own. Accordingly, to the Court, favorable evidence is heightened evidence 
that tends to suggest materiality and is highly likely to be material, but on its own, is not material. 
Id. 
 202. See supra note 189. 
 203. See supra note 201. 
 204. See supra Part III.C. 
 205. See supra Part III.C. 
 206. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963). 
 207. See Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 66. 
 208. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 101 (―Because the prosecutor alone can 
know and weigh what is undisclosed, he is faced with serious and potentially conflicting 
responsibilities: to decide whether information is exculpatory, and, if so, whether and when it 
should be disclosed to the accused. [Therefore, a] rule of criminal procedure would provide 
welcome guidance in carrying out these responsibilities, and would thereby help to ensure fair trials 
and sentencing.‖); see also supra Part III.C. 
 209. See supra Part III.C.  
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consistently applied, and ultimately, will help ensure that wrongful 
convictions do not occur.
210
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The debate over a proposed amendment to Rule 16 resumed on October 
14, 2009 and recently culminated on April 16, 2010 as the Criminal Rules 
Advisory Committee, again, declined to take any action to adopt a codified 
rule.
211
 There can be no doubt, however, that the debate is not going away 
any time soon. Quite the opposite. The Advisory Committee has wrestled 
with the issue since the Supreme Court first articulated the material 
evidence standard in Brady over forty-five years ago and it will continue to 
contentiously debate the issue as long as prosecutorial non-disclosure 
pervades the criminal justice system.  
It will not be long before the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee 
reconsiders the issue again. The next time around,  however, the Advisory 
Committee will be faced with three new issues. First, the Advisory 
Committee will want to discover what impact the USAM amendments had 
on prosecutorial disclosure.  Second, the Advisory Committee will have to 
evaluate the success of the DOJ‘s ―multi-faceted approach‖ in addressing 
prosecutorial error.
212
 And finally, the Committee will want to consider 
whether an empirical study of all ninety-four federal jurisdictions should be 
conducted.
213
  
Indeed, the hope of the USAM addressing and providing a solution to 
prosecutor disclosure abuses was a compelling reason why the Advisory 
Committee put off an amendment proposal in 2006
214
 and indefinitely 
suspended their consideration in 2007.
215
 Although the Advisory 
Committee hoped to discover the USAM‘s effect by 2010, the 
Committee‘s discussions with the Federal Judicial Center revealed that 
measuring the efficacy of the USAM‘s changes does not easily lend itself 
to research using the Federal Judicial Center.
216
 Since those discussions, 
however, new ideas for how to study the effect of the USAM‘s changes 
have surfaced.
217
 Indeed, four years have passed since the DOJ‘s 2007 
                                                                                                                     
 210. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 20, at 101. 
 211. Memorandum from Sara Sun Beale, Professor, to Criminal Rules Advisory Comm. (Sept. 
20, 2009), in ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIM. RULES, MEETING IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 
13–14, at 198 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agen 
da%20Books/Criminal/CR2009-10.pdf; see supra Part II.C.1. 
 212. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  
 213. See supra notes 102–03. 
 214. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Meeting Minutes 
44–45 (Apr. 3–4, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/  
Rule%2016%20Part%201.pdf.  
 215. History of Rule 16 Amendments, supra note 72, at 1;ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL 
RULES, supra note 98, at 12.  
 216. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 7 (Apr. 15–16, 
2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR2010-04-
min.pdf. 
 217. Professor Sara Sun Beale of Duke University has proposed that there is a way to measure 
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changes to the USAM, and the Advisory Committee will be quite 
interested in exploring these new methods to study the USAM‘s effect.218 
However, even if such a study could be undertaken, the results may not 
have a significant impact. Given the internal nature of the USAM and its 
lack of judicial enforceability,
219
 it is highly likely that the Advisory 
Committee may still conclude that USAM internal ―policy‖ should not 
supersede the adoption of a codified and independently enforced 
amendment to the Rule.  
In addition to studying the impact of the USAM changes, the Advisory 
Committee will also want to evaluate the DOJ‘s ―multi-faceted approach‖ 
to the issue of disclosure. Indeed, it appears that one of the primary reasons 
the Advisory Committee deferred action on an amendment in April 2010 
was to consider whether the ―ongoing efforts at the Department of 
Justice . . . [could] better address the discovery obligations of 
prosecutors.‖220 While the DOJ‘s ―multi-faceted approach‖ represents the 
most dramatic step taken by the government to date, the DOJ‘s failure over 
the last eight years to provide an effective internal solution provides little 
hope that another internal DOJ policy will eliminate non-disclosure 
inconsistencies or prosecutorial bias from occurring in the future. 
Accordingly, it is likely that the Advisory Committee may conclude that 
inter-departmental requirements, self-policing of violations, and federal 
prosecutors‘ ―sincere desire to ‗do the right thing‘‖221 are not sufficient to 
deter this intrinsic problem. 
Furthermore, one final element that will be important in the equation of 
a future amendment is whether the Advisory Committee believes an 
empirical study on the disclosure issue is even possible.
222
 While the 
                                                                                                                     
the efficacy of the USAM‘s affect on prosecutorial disclosure. Such a study would ―emulate a 
model used by hospitals to improve the delivery of health care, whereby the hospital reviews the 
treatment of patients in cases selected at random.‖ Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm on Criminal 
Rules, Meeting Minutes 6 (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rules 
AndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR10-2009-min.pdf. Beale suggested the Department of Justice could 
have conducted this review in U.S. Attorneys‘ offices ―to see if any undetected discovery problems 
had occurred.‖ Id. at 6–7.  
 218. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 219. See Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes 32 (June 
11–12, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016% 
20Part%201.pdf (―[T]he committee would have no way to monitor the practical operation of the 
changes or even to know about problems that might arise in individual cases. [Furthermore,] the 
[USAM] is a purely internal document of the Department of Justice and not judicially 
enforceable.‖).  
 220. See Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 6 (Apr. 15–16, 
2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR2010-04-
min.pdf.  
 221. Id.  
 222. Id. at 1–4. When the Standing Committee indefinitely suspended its consideration of a 
Brady amendment in 2007, it suggested that the Advisory Committee consider whether the 
continued study of the Rule 16 amendment proposal would be beneficial. Id. Primarily, it wanted 
the Advisory Committee to determine whether a comprehensive study of the current local rules was 
possible or beneficial. Id. 
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Federal Judicial Center has undertaken three previous studies, each were 
time pressured and underfunded.
223
 Its report in 2007 was rather limited as 
acknowledged in the report itself.
224
 Also, the Committee itself recognized 
that the 2010 survey would also be limited.
225
 Accordingly, in April of 
2010, the members of the Advisory Committee generally agreed that a 
more comprehensive survey that examined all ninety-four federal 
jurisdictions would be required to more effectively study the issue.
226
 
When this issue comes before the Advisory Committee again, the Advisory 
Committee will need to determine whether it believes that such a 
comprehensive study could be undertaken.
227
 If the Advisory Committee 
believes that such an exhaustive study is possible and necessary, the 
proposed amendment may be years off, and its fate will rely extensively on 
that study. On the other hand, however, it may be more likely that the 
Advisory Committee concludes such a time-consuming, costly, and 
extensive review should not be undertaken.
228
 No matter how under 
resourced or time pressured previous studies by the Federal Judicial Center 
have been, the one fact the 2004, 2007, and 2010 studies concluded is that 
prosecutorial suppression of material evidence is difficult to study 
empirically.
229
 Many instances of suppression are never uncovered, and 
therefore, it is difficult to know the true impact of suppression.
230
 
Although it remains to be seen what the Advisory Committee will 
conclude on these three issues, it is clear that circumstances have 
significantly changed over the last four years. First, United States v. 
Stevens brings a high-profile, emotionally sympathetic example to the 
present debate.
231
 Not only is the case of Sentator Stevens, a well-known 
political figure, an example of the consequences at stake, but his mere 
involvement might hit close to home for decisionmakers. Indeed, his 
                                                                                                                     
 223. LAURAL L. HOOPER, JENNIFER E. MARSH & BRIAN YEH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TREATMENT OF 
BRADY V. MARYLAND MATERIAL IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS: RULES, ORDERS, AND 
POLICIES: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (2004); see infra notes 224–27 and accompanying text. 
 224. HOOPER & THORPE, supra note 89, at 9. 
 225. When Judge Richard Tallman, the committee chairman, made his closing remarks on the 
issue to the Advisory Committee in October of 2009, he explained that due to the time required to 
perform the research of an empirical study, the Advisory Committee was unlikely to see a draft 
amendment for consideration at the next meeting in May 2010.‖ Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm on 
Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 8 (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR10-2009-min.pdf. 
 226. Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 7–8 (Apr. 15–16, 
2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR2010-04-
min.pdf. 
 227. HOOPER, MARSH & YEH, supra note 227, at 2. 
 228. Id. at 12–14. 
 229. See HOOPER & THORPE, supra note 89, at 7–8; HOOPER, MARSH & YEH, supra note 224, at 
4–5; supra note 227 and accompanying text.  
 230. See Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes 37 (June 
11–12, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%20  
16%20Part%201.pdf. 
 231. See Johnson & Wilber, supra note 4.  
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former colleagues will ultimately be the ones responsible for passing the 
Rule. Undoubtedly, his political prominence in relation to the issue will be 
influential.
 
 Secondly, his case seems to have brought an energized surge to 
amend led by prominent members of the federal judiciary.
232
 Other 
circumstances will likely play a major role as well, for example, the impact 
of the new DOJ ―multi-faceted approach,‖233 the increasing amount of 
commentators studying the issue,
234
 and the case studies provided by states 
with full disclosure discovery laws.
235
 States that require disclosure of all 
evidence will certainly provide another angle from which to evaluate the 
strengths and weaknesses of the current system and its alternatives.
236
 
Ultimately, one of the most significant changes this time around is that the 
current movement for an amendment seems to be refocusing the issue on 
unintentional cognitive bias rather than intentional abuse.
237
  
To address the inherent structural flaws in the current rule and 
counteract the unintentional effects of cognitive bias, an amendment to 
Rule 16  needs to be adopted.
238
 As this Note demonstrates, the absence of 
objective guidelines in the present discretionary standard permit a 
prosecutor to exclusively engage in the very type of case-specific analysis 
that is highly susceptible to cognitive bias.
239
 Because of these cognitive 
biases, when prosecutors err in applying the standard, they tend to 
underestimate, not overestimate, materiality.
240
 Accordingly, the present 
standard may cause even well-intentioned prosecutors to under-disclose 
material evidence.
241
 This fact alone is the most compelling reason for a 
Brady amendment to date.
242
 Unlike other causes of prosecutorial non-
disclosure,
243
 cognitive bias arguably poses the most serious threat to the 
criminal justice system because it not only affects every single prosecutor, 
but more importantly, human awareness alone cannot eliminate its 
                                                                                                                     
 232. See Letter from Emmet G. Sullivan to Richard C. Tallman, supra note 94.  
 233. Memorandum from Sara Sun Beale, supra note 211, at 198–99. 
 234. Joy, supra note 109, at 632–33 (―More recently, other commentators have argued that 
faulty judgment is more likely due to various unintentional cognitive biases that prosecutors have 
rather than assessing blame against the prosecutors.‖). 
 235. For a full discussion and analysis of North Carolina‘s open-discovery laws, see generally 
Mosteller, supra note 189. 
 236. Id.  
 237. Joy, supra note 109, at 632–33. 
 238. See supra Part III.B–C. 
 239. See supra Part III.C. 
 240. See supra Part III.A; see also Burke, supra note 22, at 494–96.  
 241. See Burke, supra note 22, at 494–96. 
 242. See id. 
 243. Joy, supra note 109, at 632–33 (reviewing the criticism, Professor Peter Joy believes that 
previous assertions of prosecutorial misconduct are attributable to one ―of three institutional 
conditions: ‗vague ethics rules that provide ambiguous guidance to prosecutors; vast discretionary 
authority with little or no transparency; and inadequate remedies for prosecutorial misconduct, 
which create perverse incentives for prosecutors to engage in, rather than refrain from, prosecutorial 
misconduct‘‖ (quoting Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and 
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 400)). 
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presence.
244
 Rather, fundamental structural changes are required.
245
 
Ultimately, across-case comparisons enumerated as objective rules in a 
codified standard will bring clarity to prosecutorial discretion.
246
 These 
bright line rules will bring an ―outsider perspective‖ to the analysis and 
will ameliorate the role that cognitive bias plays in the decisionmaking 
process.
247
 Accordingly, such a solution would help ensure that ―justice 
shall be done.‖248 
                                                                                                                     
 244. Findley & Scott, supra note 122, at 371 (―The challenge is difficult because the cognitive 
biases that contribute to the problem are not easily suppressed by self-awareness, training, or 
practice. Unfortunately, research suggests that merely informing people about a cognitive bias, or 
urging a person to overcome the bias, is to some degree ineffective.‖). 
 245. See supra Parts III & IV; see also Burke, supra note 22, at 499 (―Simply to ensure that 
defendants receive the material exculpatory evidence to which the Court believes they are entitled, 
the legal standards governing prosecutorial disclosure must be changed.‖). 
 246. See supra Part IV; see also Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 78 (―The logical adaptation to 
the influence of [cognitive] bias is a bright-line rule. A list of easily identifiable investments that are 
either per se legal or per se illegal would avoid the influence of the [cognitive] bias.‖); Joy, supra 
note 109, at 640–42 (concluding that a rule-like approach will provide certainty about the scope of 
the standard).  
 247. See supra Part III.C. 
 248. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–11 (1976) (―For though the attorney for the 
sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness and vigor, he must always be faithful to his 
client‘s [the government‘s] overriding interest that ‗justice shall be done.‘ He is the ‗servant of the 
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.‘‖ (quoting Berger v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).  
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